243 







<>* '^ ^^ ''"*'"' ^*" -^ Vi '^' ■ -^ 



* -% 






■ <^ -. 













■ \ 










'%<i^ 







■^ 






-^^ 
•V"^- 



* . o- 







^ ^^ v^' =A^r% 







o<^ 



,1, ^ .3 >. .V •-'^ 



-^^^ 













^^. A^ 
















The substance of the following essay was originally prepared for 
the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, and was read before 
the Society on Monday evening, Oct. 8, 1877. The introduction was 
written at a later period for the Atlantic Monthly. The essay is 
now sent to '"tho mc mbo r o (rf ^he^Btferety with the author's compliments. 

Marshal Grouchy published or printed, in Philadelphia, two 
pamphlets, which are in the Library of the Pennsylvania Historical 
Society in Philadelphia. The writer of this essay has not been able 
to find them elsewhere, and he would be greatly obliged to any one 
who would put him in the way of adding them to his collection of 
works on the Campaign of Waterloo. Their titles are given below. 



JOHN C. ROPES. 



53 Temple Street, 
Boston, Mass., 16 May, 1881. 




1. Observations sur la Relation de la Campagne de 1815 publiee par 
le General Gourgaud, et Refutation de quelquesunes des assertions 
d'autres eciits relatifs a la Bataille de Waterloo. Par le Marechal de 
Grouchy, Philadelphie. De I'imprimerie de J. F. Hurtel, l!^o. 124, 
2"" Rue Slid, 1818. -h l^^^i^^rL- 



^^^^f^f]^ 



2. Doutes sur I'Authenticite des Memoires Historiques attribues 
a Napoleon, et premiere Refutation de quelquesunes des assertions 
qu'ils renferment. Par le Comte de Grouchy, Philadelphie. Imprime 
par J. F. Hurtel, No. 126, Second Rue Sud, Avril, 1820. 



1881.] 



Who Lost Waterloo? 



785 



"i-i^ 



i 



-A^ 



WHO LOST WATERLOO ? /S^ Pt^t ^•. :^C'V^ 



The interest so generally revived in 
the life of Napoleon the First, awak- 
ened by the publication of the Memoirs 
of Madame de R^musat and of Prince 
Metternich, might be a sufficient apolo- 
gy for a discussion of the subject named 
at the head of this article. But vphen 
it is remembered that the campaign of 
Waterloo has been studied anew since 
the advent of the second empire ; that 
it has been thoroughly investigated by 
those whose aim was not strictly a his- 
torical aim, but a partisan aim, who en- 
deavored by the conclusions at which 
they arrived either to support or to de- 
stroy the prestige of the first Napoleon, 
it may well be admitted to be capable 
of receiving a more impartial treatment 
than it has yet obtained, now that polit- 
ical affairs have taken such a turn in 
France that, for the moment at least, 
the prestige of the great emperor is 
not a material factor in public opinion. 
Add to this that the complete, the over- 
whelming defeat suffered at Waterloo 
by such a master of the art of war as 
Napoleon confessedly was must always 
awaken curiosity and surprise. It was a 
total failure, suffered by a man whose 
genius for war has never been surpassed, 
and whose experience in war has prob- 
ably never been equaled. The world 
is never tired of asking, How did it 
come about that such a man met such a 
crushing disaster, such a Waterloo de- 
feat? 

Now it is not the object of the pres- 
ent pages to answer this question fully. 
I have room to deal with only one of 
the subjects suggested by that question. 
But this is perhaps the most important 
one of all : it relates to the failure of 
Marshal Grouchy, commanding the right 
wing of the army, either to prevent the 
Prussians from joining the English, or 
to joiD, himself, the main army under 

VOL. XLVii. — NO. 284.. 50 



the emperor. It will generally be ad- 
mitted that Napoleon had a force suffi- 
cient to defeat the motley army under 
the Duke of Wellington, had Grouchy 
prevented the Prussians from uniting 
with it. He would have been able U> 
use against it the 16,000 men with which 
he kept the Prussians at bay all tlie after- 
noon. It may fairly be contended that 
if the two corps under Grouchy had re- 
inforced the main army they would at 
least have averted the rout of the French 
army, even if the Prussians had joined 
the English. But Grouchy neither pre- 
vented the union of the allies, nor did 
he join his master. Wellington and 
Bliicher effected an unopposed junction 
of their forces, and overwhelmed the un- 
assisted army of Napoleon. Grouchy, in 
fact, was, at the critical moment, some 
seven or eight miles off, on the other 
side of the Prussians. 

Naturally enough, a controversy arose 
out of this state of things. It has lasted 
down to our time, and cannot yet be said 
to be closed. The emperor and his 
friends have laid the blame of the loss 
of the battle upon Grouchy ; the mar- 
shal and his friends have maintained 
that he obeyed faithfully the orders of 
the emperor. Grouchy's cause has been 
taken up by th^se French historians 
who, like Charras and Quinet, wrote 
during the second empire with a view 
of exploding what they termed " la le- 
gende napoUonienne ;" and also by Colo- 
nel Chesney in his able Waterloo Lect- 
ures, General Shaw-Kennedy, and oth- 
ers. Napoleon's side of the question has 
been maintained not only by Thiers, but 
by several other writers, of more author- 
ity, though of less repute. The whole 
matter has been treated with a great deal 
too much of heat and partisan feeling. 
It is possible, I think, to arrive at a more 
correct conclusion than any to be found 



786 



Who Lost Waterloo? 



[June, 



in the books, and I trust that the dis- 
cussion may prove not uninteresting. 

What, then, are the facts in regard to 
this celebrated controversy ? 

The emperor invaded Belgium on 
June 15, 1815. He divided his army 
into three portions : intrusting to Ney 
the left wing, consisting of the first and 
second corps, to Grouchy the right wing, 
consisting of the third and fourth corps, 
and retaining the sixth corps and the 
guard under his own immediate control. 
Orders, which it is not necessary to quote 
here, were issued on the morning of the 
16th, the day on which were fought the 
battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras, giving 
to each of these marshals the charge of 
these wings of the army. 

Napoleon's object in the campaign 
was to separate the allied armies, and 
beat them in detail. Their cantonments 
extended over a hundred miles of ground 
from east to west, and forty from north to 
south; and, speaking generally, the Eng- 
lish were to the westward and the Prus- 
sians to the eastward of the great turn- 
pike which runs north from Charleroi to 
Brussels. There was a fine road run- 
ning from Namur northwest to Nivelles 
and Braine-le-Comte, which crossed the 
turnpike at Quatre Bras. The English 
base of operations was the sea, — say, 
at Ostend and Antwerp ; the Prussian 
on the Lower Rhine, in the direction 
of Namur and Liege. 

Having, on the 16th, beaten the Prus- 
sians at Ligny, and, by the action fought 
by Ney at Quatre Bras, prevented the 
English from joining them, the emperor 
had so far succeeded. He thought it 
probable that the Prussians would re- 
treat on their base ; that is, towards Na- 
mur or Li^ge. The capture at five in 
the morning of the 17th of some can- 
non and prisoners near Le Mazy, on the 
Namur road, by General Pajol, of the 
cavalry, confirmed this view. Now the 
-emperor's plan was to move at once 
^v -against the English in the direction of 
•■'.' Brussels, and it would not do to allow 

,0 



the Prussian army, at or near Namur, 
to reorganize and attack his communi- 
cations. Therefore, although by no 
means certain that the Prussians had 
fallen back in this direction, he deemed 
it wise to send his whole right wing in 
pursuit of them, and push them vigor- 
ously. We can hardly suppose that if 
he had thought it more likely that the 
Prussians would retreat to the north and 
unite with the English, he would have 
thus divided his army. There would 
have been no reason for such a course. 
If, however, the Prussians should retire 
to the eastward, and seek to rally and 
return upon the French communications, 
while the emperor was manoeuvring or 
fighting near Brussels, the 34,000 men 
under Marshal Grouchy would be none 
too many, and yet might be enough to 
answer the purpose of delay. At the 
same time, it was certainly possible that 
Bliicher might not retreat in the direc- 
tion of his base, and so separate himself 
from the English, but might, on the con- 
trary, seek to join Wellington, and try 
the fate of another battle. And of this 
possibility it was of course necessary to 
warn Marshal Grouchy, so that he might, 
in this event, operate so as to keep the 
Prussians separated from the English. 

That the defeated Prussians should 
have been pushed the night of the battle, 
and the direction of their retreat ascer- 
tained, no one can deny. Some writers 
lay blame on Grouchy for this over- 
sight ; but to my mind the emperor and 
Soult, his chief of staff, are much more 
to be blamed. No one went out in 
search of the enemy but Pajol, with two 
regiments ; and whether he was sent, or 
went of his own motion, does not clear- 
ly appear. 

The next morning, also, the 17th, the 
emperor wasted, undoubtedly, a great 
deal of time. However, near noon. Na- 
poleon gave Grouchy a verbal order to 
take his two corps (the third and fourth,)' 
of Generals Vandamme and Gerard, and 
the cavalry of Generals Pajol and Exel- 



? <? 



1881.] 



Who Lost Waterloo ? 



787 




J.P.S. 



mans, and jjut himself in pursuit of Mar- 
shal Bllicher. And here it is impor- 
tant to ascertain what Grouchy's orders 
actually were. Grouchy himself made, 
in 1819, the following statement : -^ — 

" I told him [Napoleon]," says Grou- 
chy (page 12), " that the Prussians had 
commenced their retreat the evening be- 
fore, at ten o'clock," and so forth. " These 
observations," he goes on to state, " were 

1 Observations siir la Relation de la Campagne 
do, 1815, publi^e par le G^n^ral Gourgaud; et Re- 
futation de yuelques-unes des Assertions d'Autres 



not well received. He repeated to me 
the order which he had given me, add- 
ing that it was for me to discover the 
route taken by Marshal Bliicher ; that 
he was going to fight the English ; that 
I ought to complete the defeat of the 
Prussians in attacking them as soon as 
I should have joined them ; and that 
I should correspond with him by the 
paved road which leads from a point 

Merits relatifs a la Bataille de "Waterloo. Par le 
Comte de Grouchy. A Paris. 1819. 



788 



Who Lost Waterloo f 



[June, 



near where we were to Quatre Bras.-^ 
Some moments of conversation which I 
had with the chief of staff [Soult] re- 
garded only the detaching of certain of 
my troops which were to be sent to 
Quatre Bras. Such are," Marshal Grou- 
chy solemnly states, "word for word, 
the only dispositions which were com- 
municated to me, the only orders which 
I received." 

To the same effect, he says further on 
(page 30), " But why, says the author 
of the work which I am criticising 
[Gourgaud], — why does not Marshal 
Grouchy publish the text of the orders 
which he has received ? The reason is 
simple. It is because they were trans- 
mitted verbally only. Those who have 
served under Napoleon know how rare- 
ly he gives them in writing ; and at the 
moment when he commenced to perceive 
the loss of precious time, on the morn- 
ing of the 17th, less than ever did he 
think of putting his instructions in writ- 
ing'. It is convenient, I know," the 
marshal adds, " to be able to attribute to 
the non-comprehension of verbal orders 
false movements which have been the 
result of their faithful execution," etc. 

And again, page 31 : " Besides, if it 
was of real importance to show that 
they (my orders) were only verbal, I 
could find, if not a proof, at least a 
strong indication of it in Marshal Soult's 
letter, ... in which, speaking of my 
march to Sarravalain [Sart-a-Walhain] 
he expresses himself in these terms : 
'This movement is conformed to the 
dispositions which have been communi- 
cated to you.' He would not have failed 
to say, ' to the orders which I have 
transmitted to you,' or ' to which you 
were subject,' if I had received any save 
verbal orders." 

With equal emphasis Grouchy states 

1 This implied that Grouchy's movement was 
to be on this road, which, as I have said, runs 
from Quatre Bras to Namur. 

2 Fragments Historiques relatifs a la Campagne 
de 1815, et a la Bataille de Waterloo. Par le Ge- 
neral Grouchy. Lettre a Messieurs M^ry et Bar- 



in another work, published ten years 
later, in 1829,^ " The orders of Napo- 
leon were, ' Put yourself in pursuit of 
the Prussians, complete their defeat in 
attacking them as soon as you shall join 
them, and never lose sight of them. I 
am going to reunite to the corps of Mar- 
shal Ney the troops I carry with me, to 
march upon the English, and to fight 
them if they will stand this side of the 
forest of Soignes ; you will correspond 
with me by the paved road which leads 
to Quatre Bras.' I attest upon my honor 
that these were his own expressions, that 
I received no other instruction, that the 
injunction to outflank the right of the 
Prussian army was not given to me, and 
that I did not receive until the next day 
the order to go to Wavre. This was 
given on the 18th of June, at ten o'clock 
in the morning. . . . This letter and that 
dated from the field of battle of Water- 
loo, at one o'clock, [p. m.] are the only 
ones^ that I received on the 17th and 
18th. The order-book and the corre- 
spondence of the major-general [Soult, 
chief of staff] prove this. This [book] 
reports the hours at which the orders 
were given, and the names of the oflicers 
who carried them, and its details do not 
permit a suspicion of an omission any 
more than of a misstatement." 

The terms of this verbal order are 
somewhat differently given by Grouchy 
in another place : * " Far from modify- 
ing his first orders, the emperor corrob- 
orated them in saying, ' Marshal, make 
your way to Namur, for it is on the 
Meuse that, according to all probability, 
the Prussians are retiring ; it is therefore 
in this direction that you will find them, 
and in which you ought to march.' " 

In these verbal orders not only is 
there not a single word about a possible 
intention on the part of the Prussians to 

th(51emy. Paris: Firmin Didot Frferes. 1829. 
Pages 4, 5, and note. 

3 The italics are mine. 

4 Le Mar^chal de Grouchy en 181-5, page 21. 
M^moires, vol. iv. p. 47. 



1881.] 



Who Lost Waterloo ? 



789 



unite with the English, but there is a 
distinct injunction to take a southeaster- 
ly course in pursuit of the Prussians, 
which would indicate that Napoleon had 
made up his mind that the Prussians 
had no thought whatever of effecting 
a junction with the English. To show 
that this was the only idea in Napo- 
leon's mind was plainly the object of 
Grouchy's narrative, and of these re- 
peated declarations. 

But in spite of these persistent deni- 
als, there was a written order, dictated 
by Napoleon himself, and written, in 
the absence of Soult, by General Ber- 
trand (which fact accounts for a copy 
of it not being found in the archives of 
Marshal Soult, the chief of staff), and 
received by Marshal Grouchy on the 
afternoon of the 17th. According to 
some authorities,^ it first appeared in 
a biography of Marshal Grouchy by a 
M. Pascallet,2 in 1842 (page 79). It is 
also cited ^ from a work entitled Rela- 
tion Succincte de la Campagne de 1815, 
en Belgique, Pieces et Documents Offi- 
ciels Inedits, Paris, Delanchy, 1843. 
At this time the marshal was still liv- 
ing. Nevertheless, it was not known 
to Siborne, who wrote in 1844, or to 
Van Lobeu Sels, who wrote in 1849 ; 
still less to the Count Gerard, who car- 
ried on his celebrated controversy with 
Grouchy in 1830. Charras, however, 
with his exhaustive research, discovered 
it, and published it in his History in 
1858. It appears, also, in a small work 
published in 1864, some years after 

1 Napolt^on a Waterloo. Paris : Dumaine. 1866. 
Page 199, note ; page 238, section 4. 

2 Pascallet's work is a popular biography of 
Marshal Grouchj', and quite eulogistic of him. It 
is not unliliej(y that the old marshal sent him all 
his papers, and that among them he found this 
Bertrand letter, and, naturalh- enough, published 
it. After this, it was of course impossible to con- 
ceal it longer. The title of the book is Notice Bio- 
graphique sur M. le Marechal Marquis de Grou- 
chy, Tair de France, avec des Eclaircissemens et 
des Details Historiques sur la Campagne de 1815 
dans le JNIidi de la France, et sur la Bataille de Wa- 
terloo. Par M. E. Pascallet, Fondateur et R^'dac- 
teur en chef de la Revue G^nerale Biographique, 
Politique, et Litt^raire. 



Grouchy's death, by one of his sons, the 
Marquis de Grouchy,* and it is repeat- 
ed in the elaborate Memoirs ^ of the 
marshal, published by the marquis's son 
in 1874. There is thei-efore no question 
about its authenticity. I quote from 
these last-named works : — 

" Finally, and as if to take away all 
doubt, Grouchy received about the same 
hour from the emperor the order writ- 
ten below : — 

"LiGNY, June 17, 1815.6 
" March to Gembloux with Pajol's 
cavalry. ... You will explore in the 
direction of Namur and Maestricht, and 
you will pursue the enemy ; explore his 
march, and instruct me as to his move- 
ments, so that I can find out what he is 
intending to do. I am carrying my 
head-quarters to Quatre Bras, where the 
English still were this morning. Our 
communication will then be direct, by 
the paved road of Namur. If the ene- 
my has evacuated Namur, write to the 
general commanding the second mili- 
tary division at Charlemont to cause 
Namur to be occupied by some battal- 
ions of the National Guard and some 
batteries of cannon which he will or- 
ganize at Charlemont. He will give 
the command to some general officer. 

"/if is important to find out what 
Bliicher and Wellington are intending to 
do, and if they purpose to reunite their 
armies to cover Brussels and Liege in 
trying the fate of a battle? In all cases, 
keep constantly your two corps of in- 
fantry united in a league of ground, 

3 Pajol, G^n^ral en Chef. Paris: Dumaine. 
1874. Vol. iii. p. 215. 

4 Le Marechal de Grouchy du 16 au 19 Juin, 
1815. Avec Documents Historiques Inedits et Re- 
futation de M. Thiers. Par le Gen(^^ra! de Division, 
Senateur Marquis de Grouch}'. Paris: Dentu. 
1864. Page 26. 

5 Memoires du Marechal de Grouchy. Par le 
Marquis de Grouchy, Officie.r d'Etat Major. Paris: 
Dentil. 1874. Tome iv. p. 50. 

6 The hour is given as towards three o'clock, 
but this must be an error, as Napoleon was not at 
Ligny at that time, but at Quatre Bras. The hour js 
not given in Pascallet's text, nor in Delauchy's, and 
is, without doubt, au unauthorized interpolation. 

7 The italics are mine. 



T90 



Who Lost Waterloo? 



[June, 



having several avenues of retreat, and 
post detachments of cavalry intermedi- 
ate between us, in order to communicate 
with head-quarters. 

" Dictated by the emperor in the ab- 
sence of the chief of staff. 

(Signed) The Grand Marshal, 

Bertrand." 

It seems impossible that Marshal 
Grouchy should in 1819 have forgotten 
this dispatch. There is not, however, 
in the memoirs written by his son and 
grandson, a single word of explanation 
of the absolute denials by the marshal, 
which we have just read, of the exist- 
ence of any such order.-' However we 
may account for it, this order remained 
concealed or forgotten for nearly thirty 
years. 

Let us examine its contents for a mo- 
ment. Grouchy is at first ordered to 
Gembloux; he is next told to explore 
in the dii-ection of Namur, the route 
which the emperor thought it very like- 
ly the Prussians would take, and to 
push the enemy if they are retreating 
on that road. It is then urged upon 
him that he must discover what they 
are proposing to do, and the text given 
by Charras"^ and by Pascallet,^ which 
varies a little from that given in the 
Grouchy Memoirs, puts the alternative 
with even more clearness : " It is im- 
portant to find out what the enemy is 
intending to do : whether he is separat- 
ing himself from the English, or whether 
they are intending still to unite to cover 

1 No notice seems to have been taken by Ches- 
ney of this extraordinary circumstance. He was 
too much interested, apparently, in exposing the 
mistakes made by Napoleon (who was endeavor- 
ing at St. Helena to recollect almost alone and 
unassisted, the details of the campaign, and of 
course made mistakes) to turn his attention to the 
willful concealment by Grouchy of this most im- 
portant paper. 

2 Histoire de la Campagne de 1815. Waterloo. 
Par le, Lieutenant-Colonel Charras. Fifth edition. 
Leipzig, Vol. i. p. 241. The first edition of this 
valuable work was published in 1857 or 1858. 

3 Page 80. 

* The order, as printed in Le Mar^chal de 



Brussels and Liege in trying the fate of 
a new battle." * 

Li^ge is coupled with Brussels in this 
connection simply as an alternative sup- 
position : if Brussels was to be covered, 
the Prussians must unite with the Eng- 
lish ; if Liege was to be covered, the 
English must join the Prussians. This 
suggestion, therefore, does not in the 
least injure the point of the injunction, 
which is to prevent the union of the 
allied armies, if they are seeking to 
effect a union ; otherwise, to push the 
Prussians as far to the east as he could. 

Now, as the Prussians, if they were 
going to unite with the English at all, 
would be obliged to do so on the right 
of Napoleon's army, and as he had or- 
dered his whole right wing, with plenty 
of cavalry, to find out what they were 
proposing to do, and had said in so 
many words that they might be intend- 
ing to unite with the English to cover 
Brussels in trying the fate of another 
battle, the emperor, one would think, 
had a right to dismiss the subject from 
his mind. It is inexplicable to me how 
Colonel Chesney ® can say, immediately 
after quoting the clause of which I am 
speaking, " Such was the tenor of this 
important letter, which serves to show 
two things only : that Napoleon was now 
uncertain of the line of Blucher's re- 
treat, and that he judged Gembloux a 
good point to move Grouchy on, in any 
case." To my mind, while the letter 
undoubtedly shows these two things, it 
shows a third thing quite as clearly, 

Grouchy en 1815, page 27, and in the M^moires 
du Marechal Grouchy, page 51, does not contain 
the words in italics. They appear, however, in a 
citation from the order in an Allocution said to 
have been addressed by the marshal to his ofHcers 
on the morning of the 19th. Le Marechal de 
Grouchy en 1815, page 118; M^moires, page 292. 
They are undoubtedly genuine. The italics are 
mine. 

5 Waterloo Lectures : A Study of the Campaign 
of ]8I5. By Colonel Charles C. Chesney, R. E., 
late Professor of Military Art and History in the 
Staff College. Third edition. London: Long- 
mans, Green & Co. 1874. Page 152. 



1881.] 



Who Lost Waterloo f 



791 



namely, that he foresaw the possibility 
of the junction of the allied armies, and 
warned Grouchy to prevent it. 

That evening Grouchy got only as 
far as Gembloux. From that place he 
wrote to the emperor an important let- 
ter, dated ten p. m., in which he uses this 
language : — 

" It appears, according to all the re- 
ports, that, arrived at Sauvenieres, the 
Prussians divided into two columns : 
one has taken the road to Wavre, in 
passing by Sart-a-Walhain ; the other 
column seems to be directed on Perwez} 

" One can perhaps infer from this 
that a portion is going to join Welling- 
ton, and that the centre, which is the 
army of Bliicher, is retiring on Liege ; 
another column, with artillery, having 
retreated on Namur, General Exelmans 
has the order to push this evening six 
squadrons on Sart-a-Walhain, and three 
squadrons on Perwez. 

" According to their report, if the 
mass of the Prussians retires on Wavre, 
1 shall follow it in that direction, in order 
that they may not be able to gain Brussels, 
and to separate them from Wellington. 

" If, on the contrary, my information 
proves that the principal force of the 
Prussians has marched on Perwez, I 
shall direct myself by that city in pursuit 
of the enemy." ^ 

This dispatch first appeared in Count 
Gerard's Dernieres Observations,^ pub- 
lished in 1830, and is a most important 
one. The mass of the Prussians, says 
Grouchy, are retiring in one of two di- 
rections, and I shall soon know in which. 
They are going either east, by way of 
Perwez, separating themselves from the 
English, or north, by way of Wavre, 
towards the English. If the latter, I 

1 The italics are mine. 

2 The italics are mine. 

8 Dernieres Observations sur les Operations de 
I'Aile Droite de I'Armde Fran^aise a la Bataille de 
Waterloo, en Rt^ponse a M. le Marquis de Grouchj. 
Par le Gem^ral Gerard, Depute de la Dordogne. 
Paris. 1830. Page 15. 

4 Of. Siborne, vol. i. pp. 298, 375, 381. 

5 Charras, vol. i. p. 244, 5th ed. 



shall follow them in that direction, so 
that they may not gain Brussels, and to 
separate them from Wellington. If, on 
the other hand, they have gone to Per- 
wez, I shall pursue them by that city. 
If this dispatch was the one actually 
sent by Grouchy to the emperor, what 
wonder if the latter * thought that 
Grouchy had thoronglily comprehended 
his instructions, contained in the Ber- 
trand letter, to find out whether the 
Prussians were going to separate from 
the English, or to unite with them and 
fight another battle for the defense of 
Brussels ! 

But the Grouchy Memoirs, vol. iv. p. 
58 (also the Mai'echal de Grouchy en 
1815, pages 37, 194), give a different 
reading : " If I learn by the reports, which 
I hope will come to me during the night, 
that strong masses of Prussians are going 
to Wavre, I shall follow them in this di- 
rection, and shall attack them as soon 
as I shall have joined them." And the 
sentence stating his intention of march- 
ing on Perwez, if he finds that the mass 
of the enemy have gone in that direc- 
tion, is entirely omitted. 

It seems to me altogether probable 
that this last version is a willful altera- 
tion of the correct text. Charras was 
one of the most accurate of writers ; he 
gives the other text.^ No one can sup- 
pose the Count Gerard to have falsified 
the text ; he gives it differently from the 
Grouchys. In fact, no one ^ has fol- 
lowed the Grouchy text. It may appear 
harsh to say so, but the temptation to 
expunge from a dispatch of Marshal 
Grouchy's, written on the 17th, the ex- 
pression of an intention of so raanoeu- 
vriug the next day, in case the bulk of 
the Prussians are going to Wavre, as to 

6 Chesney, 3d ed., p. 153. Siborne's History 
of the War in France and Belgium in 1815, 2d ed., 
vol. i. p. 297, London, 1844. Napoleon a Water- 
loo, par un Ancien Officier de la Garde Imperiale, 
Paris, 1866, pages 220, 243. Quinet, Histoire de ■ 
la Campagne de 1815, Paris, 1862, page 430. De 
la Tour d'Auvergne, Waterloo: Etude de la Cam- 
pagne de 1815, Paris, 1870, page 231. 



792 



WTio Lost Waterloo ? 



[June, 



separate them from Wellington seems 
to have been too strong to be resisted. 
, Not that this intention of the marshal's 
was a wrong one ; on the contrary, 
nothing could have been more correct, 
more clearly in accordance with the de- 
mands of the situation. Wellington was 
on the Brussels turnpike, followed by 
the emperor. If the mass of the Prus- 
sians had retired upon Wavre, it was 
plainly with the view of joining the 
duke ; and in that case the one thing for 
Grouchy to do was to try to prevent 
them from carrying out this jDlan, — to 
follow them in the " direction " of Wavre, 
as distinguished from the " direction " 
of Perwez, and to manoeuvre so as to 
separate them from Wellington. Noth- 
ing, we repeat, could possibly have been 
better than this. But Grouchy did not, 
the next day, even attempt this task.^ 
Although he found out before daybreak 
that the mass of the Prussians had re- 
treated on Wavre, he kept himself out- 
side of them, so to speak, and not be- 
tween them and the Brussels pike ; and, 
instead of trying to separate them from 
Wellington, pushed them, by advancing 
on Wavre, nearer to the English army. 
This he did, he says in his justification, 
because his only orders were to pur- 
Sue them and attack them as soon as 
he should have caught up with them. 
Hence, as we suspect, the alteration ^ of 
his dispatch : " I shall attack them as 
soon as I shall have caught up with 
them," instead of, " I shall try to sepa- 
rate them from Wellington." 

But while this alteration of this dis- 
patch might perhaps have served the 
purpose of preserving Grouchy's con- 
sistency if the Bertrand order had never 
been brought to light, it cannot do so 
,now. For now that we know that the 
emperor did not (as Grouchy maintained 

1 Cf. Siborne, vol. i. pp. 318, 319. 

2 I am not aware of this altered version appear- 
ing in print till the j'ear 1864, which was some 
seventeen j'ears after Grouchy's death, when it 
was inserted in Le Mar^chal de Grouchy en 1815, 
page 37 ; see also page 194. 

3 It is probable that Soult was not well suited 



for nearly thirty years) content himself 
with a mere verbal order to pursue the 
Prussians and attack them as soon as he 
should have found them, but did, besides, 
warn him in a written order that they 
might attempt to unite with the Eng- 
lish in trying the fate of another battle 
to cover Brussels, the accepted text of 
Grouchy's report to the emperor fits in 
perfectly with the emperor's warning. 
If they are going to Wavre, Grouchy 
says, they are of course going to unite 
with the English, and I will try to pre- 
vent this junction. 

This dispatch reached Napoleon about 
midnight, at his bivouac before the Eng- 
lish army. Grouchy told the officer who 
carried it to bring back a reply. But 
such was the carelessness of the emperor 
and Soult ^ that none was returned. No 
reply was written till ten o'clock the 
next morning. Yet the emperor believed, 
was almost certain, that he was to tight 
the duke th'e next day. Why he did 
not order Grouchy to march at day- 
break to join him by the bridge of Mous- 
ty, or at any rate to occupy that bridge 
and the defiles of the Lasne beyond it ; or 
at least why he did not take the trouble to 
say in so many words to Grouchy that 
if the mass of the Prussians was at 
Wavre, he, Grouchy, must be at the 
earliest moment between Wavre and the 
main army under the emperor, and in 
close communication with him, cannot be 
explained. Perhaps he thought, as he 
had certainly good reason to think from 
the marshal's dispatches to him, that he 
would do this without further instruc- 
tions ; but the emperor's negligence in 
this regard cannot be defended. " It 
was a grievous fault, and grievously 
hath Ceesar answered it." 

Grouchy, who was up all night get- 
ting in the reports of his cavalry and 
for the position of chief of staff. He had been 
for years the commander of an army, and had had 
a chief of staff of his own. He was certainly un- 
able to supply the place of Berthier, who had been 
the emperor's chief of staff in all his campaigns, , 
but had, unfortunately, left France with the king 



1881.] 



Who Lost Waterloo P 



798 



finding out the whereabouts of the Prus- 
sians, wrote two other dispatches to the 
emperor, one at two A. m., and the other 
at three A. M. ; but the former of these 
has been lost. The emperor states in 
his St. Plelena narrative that in the first 
of these dispatches Grouchy said he was 
going to start from Gembloux at day- 
break, and to march to TVavre.^ Grouchy 
begins his three-o'clock disjjatch by say- 
ing,^ " All my reports and information 
confirm that the enemy is retiring on 
Brussels, there to concentrate, or to de- 
liver battle after being united to Wel- 
lington." He goes on to say, " I go 
this moment to Sart-a-Walhain, whence 
I shall proceed to Corbaix and Wavre." 

I leave to Charras ^ the task of point- 
ing out the error which the marshal com- 
mitted in moving by way of Sart-a-Wal- 
hain upon Wavre. He should, as Char- 
ras demonstrates, have marched at day- 
break on Mousty,* there crossing the 
Dyle, and thus approaching the emperor, 
and moving towards Wavre or St. Lam- 
bert, as might be thought best. This 
opinion derives all the more force from 
the well-known conclusion of Charras 
that had Grouchy done all this, — " had 
he," ^ on the 18th, " marched sooner and 
manoeuvred as the circumstances and 
the rules of strategy indicated, the dis- 
aster of Waterloo would have been nei- 
ther less sure nor less complete." Char- 
ras is therefore a better authority on 
the question of what Grouchy ought to 
have done than those (like Gerard, for 
instance) whose judgments may be biased 
by their regrets at what they consider 
might have beeu and was not accom- 
plished by him. 

Although the sun rises at Brussels on 
the 18th of June at twelve minutes be- 
fore four A. M., Grouchy did not suc- 
ceed in getting his two corps started till 

1 But see Obs. sur la Camp, de 1815, pages 88, 
89, where Grouchy doubts having written this in 
this dispatch. 

2 Le Mardchal de Grouchy en 1815, page 46. 
Grouch}' Memoires, vol. iv. p. 65. 

8 Charras, vol. ii. pp. 57 et seq., 5th ed. 



seven and eight o'clock respectively ! 
By eleven o'clock the corps of Van- 
damme, which was in the advance, had 
passed Sart-a-Walhain, about four miles 
from Gembloux. Gerard's corps was 
approaching the village. No reconnais- 
sances whatever appear to have beeu 
made on the left of the column. The 
mai'shal sent off another dispatch* to the 
emperor, dated eleven o'clock. He says 
that the first, second, and third corps of 
Bliicher are marching in the direction 
of Brussels ; that a corps coming from 
Liege (Blilow's) has effected a junction 
with those who have fought at Fleurus 
(Ligny) ; that " some of the Prussians 
whom I have before me are directing 

o 

themselves towards the plain of the 
Chyse, situated near the road of Louvain, 
and at two and one half leagues from 
this city." " It would seem," he goes on 
to state, " that this is with the intention 
of concentrating there, or of fighting the 
troops which j^vxrsue them, or finally of 
reuniting with Wellington, a project an- 
nounced by their officers, who, with their 
customary bravado, pretend that they 
only quitted the field of battle on the 
16th with the view of effecting a junc- 
tion with the English army on Brussels. 

" This evening I shall be massed at 
Wavre, and shall thus find myself be- 
tween Wellington, whom I presume to 
be in retreat before your majesty, and 
the Prussian army." 

From the last part of this dispatch ]t 
looks as if Grouchy thought that the 
Prussians were concentrating at or near 
Louvain. One certainly cannot com- 
prehend how else he can say that by tak- 
ing position at Wavre he would be sep- 
arating the Prussians from the English. 

But in half an hour after this dispatch 
was written he heard the cannon of 
Waterloo. This of course exploded his 

* There was another bridge at Ottiguies, about 
half a mile north of Mousty, which would have 
been available. 

5 Charras, vol. ii. p. 65, 5th ed. 

6 Le Marechal de Grouchy en 1815, page 54. 
Grouchy Memoires, vol. iv. p. 71. 



794 



Who Lost Waterloo f 



[June, 



belief that the English were retreating 
before the emperor, and no doubt also 
convinced him that the Prussians were 
not thinking of " the plain of the Chyse," 
but were, on the contrary, going to join 
the English from Wavre as fast as they 
could. Why, under these circumstances, 
he refused the counsel of Gerard, who 
urged him to march straight to the sound 
of the cannon, it is hard to conjecture. 
His son tells us ^ that his father did not 
find the advice so bad in itself, but the 
form employed to present it was objec- 
tionable. The fact was that Grouchy 
had had constant trouble with both Ge- 
rard and Vandamme ; his report to the 
emperor is full of complaints against 
them for repeated acts of disobedience ; ^ 
and I think it very possible that the ad- 
vice of Gerard was proffered (as Grouchy 
himself says) in a form very offensive to 
his superior, and that this really did ma- 
terially influence the latter in deciding 
against it. 

As to the results of this movement had 
it been attempted, the authorities differ. 
Charras,^ who thinks it shoiild have been 
tried, says it would have done no good. 
Chesney,* however, admits that one, or 
perhaps two, of the Prussian corps might 
have been stopped by Grouchy. I have 
not the time to go into this subject, but 
I am inclined to think that if Grouchy 
had so marched at noon the battle of 
Waterloo would have been a drawn bat- 
tle, with the chances for the next day 
largely in favor of the allies, with their 
superior numbers. To produce a favora- 
ble result for Napoleon, Grouchy should 
have marched in the direction of Wavre 
by way of Mousty the instant he was 
sure that the Prussians were not going 
east, but were going north to unite with 
the English ; that is, at daybreak, at four 
A. M. If he had done this, he would 
have joined Napoleon by noon, the Prus- 
sians would have been checked at St. 

1 Le Mareclial de Grouchy en 1815, page 59. 

2 Ibid., pages 84-87, 92. 

8 Cliarras, vol. ii. p. 66, 5th ed. 

< Chesney, page 201, 3d ed., where he cites the 



Lambert, and the emperor would have 
defeated the duke's army by three o'clock 
in the afternoon, in all probability. 

We are now, I believe, in possession 
of all the material facts which could 
have influenced Marshal Grouchy in his 
movements upon Wavre on the 17th 
and 18th days of June, 1815. We have 
seen that he declared at first that the 
emperor did not, on the 17th, give him 
any written order ; that his verbal in- 
structions said not a word about the pos- 
sibility of a junction of the Prussians 
with the Duke of Wellington, but indi- 
cated that the Prussians had retreated 
in the direction of Namur. 

We have seen, however, that, finally, 
in the course of many years, his written 
order, the Bertrand letter, was made pub- 
lic, and that in that letter the emperor 
did clearly warn him of a possible re- 
union of the two armies with the inten- 
tion of fighting another battle to cover 
Brussels (or Liege, as the case might 
be). We have seen that in his first dis- 
patch, dated from Gembloux, written, 
as it were, in reply to this, he assured 
the emperor that if the mass of the 
Prussians was retreating east he should 
follow it by way of Perwez ; but if it 
was falling back to Wavre, he should 
follow it in that direction, so as to pre- 
vent their gaining Brussels and to sep- 
arate them from Wellington. We have 
seen that on the receipt of this the em- 
peror carelessly, but perhaps naturally, 
seems to have considered that the mar- 
shal comprehended the situation, and 
sent him no more dispatches till the one 
dated ten in the morning of the bat- 
tle, which did not reach him till after 
four p. M., and of which we are soon to 
speak ; and that Grouchy, having found 
out before daybreak that the Prussians 
were retiring on Brussels, yet, instead 
of approaching the emperor, and trying 
to get between the Prussians and the 
opinions of Jomini, Clausewitz, Miiffling, etc. 
Siborne, 2d ed., vol. i. pp. 320-323, gives a good 
statement of what Grouchy might have accom- 
plished. 



1881.] 



Who Lost Waterloo f 



795 



English, persisted, in spite of Gerard's 
advice, in marching on Wavre by ex- 
terior lines of operation, thereby putting 
the Prussian army between himself and 
the forces contending at Waterloo. 

But Marshal Grouchy alleges that, 
after all, the emperor made exactly the 
same mistake that he did, if mistake it 
was. For in a dispatch dated the 18th, 
at ten A. M., and signed by Soult, he is 
told to direct his movements on Wavre, 
where he ought to arrive as soon as pos- 
sible. In fact, Grouchy sets up this 
dispatch in his own defense, in his re- 
port ^ to the emperor. And though this 
dispatch was not received by him until 
four o'clock in the afternoon, which was 
of course too late to be of any use, he 
urges, and with great apparent force, 
that had he seen this dispatch at the 
moment it was penned he would not 
have been justified in doing anything 
else than what he actually did. Let us, 
however, hear the whole dispatch : ^ — 

En avant de la feeme de Caillou, ) 
le 18 Juin, 1815, a dix heures du matin. ) 

Monsieur le Maeechal, — The 
emperor has received your last report, 
dated from Gembloux. 

You speak to his majesty of only 
two Prussian columns which have passed 
at Sauvenieres and Sart-a-Walhain. 
Nevertheless, reports say that a third 
column, which was a pretty strong one, 
has passed by Gery and Gentinues, di- 
rected on "Wavre. 

The emperor instructs me to tell 
you that at this moment his majesty is 
going to attack the English army, which 
has taken position at Waterloo, near the 
forest of Soignes. Thus his majesty de- 
sires that you will direct your move- 
ments on Wavre, in order to approach 
us, to put yourself in the sphere [en rap- 
port^ of our operations, and keep up 
your communications with us ; pushing 

1 Le Marechal de Grouchy en 1815, page 64. 
M^moires, vol. iv. p. 79. 

2 Le Marechal de Grouchy en 1815, page 81; 
M^moires, vol. iv. p. 319. See also Chesney, 



before you those troops of the Prussian 
army which have taken this direction, 
and which may have stopped at Wavre, 
where you ought to arrive as soon as 
possible. 

You will follow the enemy's columns, 
which are on your right, by some light 
troops, in order to observe their move- 
ments and pick up their stragglers. In- 
struct me immediately of your disposi- 
tions and of your march, as also of the 
news which you have of the enemy, and 
do not neglect to keep up your commu- 
nications with us. The emperor desires 
to have news from you very often. 

(Signed) The Marshal Duke of Dal- 
matia. 

To understand this dispatch we must 
refer to those to which it is an answer, 
and particularly to that written by 
Grouchy from Gembloux, at ten o'clock 
the night before. In that he says, as 
will be remembered, " If the mass of the 
Prussians retires on Wavre, I sluxll fol- 
low it in that direction, in order that 
they may not be able to gain Brussels 
and to separate them from Wellington. 
If, on the contrary, my information 
proves that the principal force of the 
Prussians has marched on Perivez, I shall 
direct myself by this city in pursuit of 
the enemy." 

Now Soult, having, doubtless, this let- 
ter before him when he wrote, simply 
says. Do not take Perwez direction ; 
take the Wavre direction, so as to ap- 
proach us.^ It not only did not follow 
from this that Grouchy was to march 
upon Wavre on the right bank of the 
Dyle, but, on the contrary, as he was to 
direct his movements on Wavre iji order 
to approach the main army and to put 
himself " within the sphere of its oper- 
ations," it was necessary for him to op- 
erate on the left bank of tlie river. It 
was certainly the leading thought of this 
pages 206, 222, 3d ed. ; Kennedy's Battle of Water- 
loo, page 161. 
3 Of. Siborne, vol. i. p. 380, note, 2d ed. 



796 



Who Lost Waterloo ? 



[June, 




letter that Grouchy was to come within 
speaking distance of the main army. 
For him to quote this letter as justify- 
ing him in his exterior movement upon 
Wavre, on the right bank of the river, 
without any sort of communication with 
the emperor, is, we submit, to distort its 
meaning. If he could have read it in 
the light of the facts before him at the 
time it was written, it is apparent that 
he could not have obeyed it unless he 
should cross the Dyle at Mousty, com- 
municate directly with the emperor, and 
opei-ate against Wavre in communica- 
tion with and conjunction with the main 
army, so as to be between them and the 
Prussians. Still, though I believe this 
to be the true interpretation, I cannot 
understand the omission in this dispatch 
of a clear and definite statement of the 
route to be pursued by Grouchy's col- 
umn. What could have been easier 
than to have said. Cross the Dyle at 
once, get thus in communication with 
us, and then operate on our right flank ? 
But the emperor and his chief of staff ap- 
pear to have left all details to Grouchy 
to work out as well as he could. As in 



the Bertrand letter, so in this letter of 
Soult's, and more especially in the next 
letter, as we shall soon point out, the 
emperor seems to have been perfectly 
satisfied with merely indicating to his 
lieutenant the object to be attained, — 
whether it was the preventing of the 
junction of the Prussians and the Eng- 
lish, or the abandoning of the Perwez 
direction and adoption of the Wavre di- 
rection, so as to approach the main army, 
— and to have left it entirely to Grouchy 
to take the proper line of operations to 
secure these objects. With a Massena 
or a Davoust this method would have 
sufficed ; with Grouchy it was a total 
failure. 

At one o'clock in the afternoon of the 
18th another and last dispatch was sent 
to Grouchy, on certain expressions in 
which, although it did not reach him un-^ 
til seven o'clock in the evening, he re- 
lies as showing that his course was con- 
formed to the emperor's views at the 
moment. Let us, however, see the 
whole dispatch : ^ — 

1 Le Mar^chal de Grouchy en 1815, page 67. 
M^moires, vol. iv. p. 82. 



1881.] 



W7io Lost Waterloo ? 



797 



18 Juin, uue heure apr^s midi. 

Monsieur le Marechal, — You 
have written to the emperor at three 
o'clock this morning that you would 
march on Sart-a-TYalhain : your inten- 
tion then is to go to Corbaix and Wavre. 
This movement is conformable to his 
majesty's arrangements which have been 
communicated to you. Nevertheless, 
the emperor orders me to tell you that 
you ought always to manoeuvre in our 
direction, and to seek to come near to 
our army, in order that you may join 
us before any corps can put itself be- 
tween us. I do not indicate to you the 
direction you should take ; it is for you 
to see the place where we are, to govern 
yourself accordingly, and to connect our 
communications so as to be always pre- 
pared to fall upon any of the enemy's 
troops which may endeavor to annoy 
our right, and to destroy them. 

At this moment the battle is in prog- 
ress ^ on the line of "Waterloo, in front 
of the forest of Soignes. The enemy's 
centre is at Mont St. Jean ; manoeuvre, 
therefore, to join our right. 

(Signed) The Marshal Duke of Dal- 
matia. 

P. S. A letter which has just been 
intercepted says that General Biilow is 
about to attack our right flank ; we be- 
lieve that we see this corps on the height 
of St. Lambert. So lose not an instant 
in drawing near us and joining us, in 
order to crush Biilow, whom you will 
take in the very act. 

(Signed) The Marshal Duke of Dal- 
matia. 

In this dispatch it is not difficult to 
cull out expressions which apparently 
favor the course taken by the marshal. 
But when it is said that the march on 
Corbaix and Wavre is conformable to 
the emperor's views, it is, we repeat, 

1 The text given in the above works is errone- 
ous in one respect: it gives "la bataille est ga- 
gnde " for " la bataille est engagde." See Charras, 
vol. i. p. 287, 5th ed. Also, Seconde Declaration du 
G^n^ral le S^n^cal ; Le Mar^chal, etc., page 113. 



as contra-distinguished from a march to 
the eastward, in the direction of Namur 
or Perwez. It is, in fact, because the di- 
rection of Wavre will bring him near 
the main army that it is ordered. And 
when the emperor goes on to say that 
the marshal must manoeuvre in his di- 
rection — to seek to come near to his 
army, to Join him, even, before any 
corps of the enemy can get between 
them — the meaning of the first part of 
the dispatch becomes perfectly clear. 
And as if to warn Grouchy not to rely 
on any isolated expressions, the emperor 
proceeds to say that he is not giving him 
precise orders of march, but that he re- 
lies on him to find out where the main 
army is, to govern himself accordingly, 
to connect his communications with it, 
and to be prepared to fall on any of the 
enemy's troops which may seek to annoy 
or attack the right flank of the army. 

This dispatch therefore confirms the 
truth of the remark we made before, 
that the emperor satisfied himself in his 
letters to Grouchy with general direc- 
tions, and never went into details. He 
told him what he expected him to accom- 
plish, and left him entire judge of the 
means of doing it. Thus, in his first 
dispatch, the Bertrand letter, while he 
tells him to explore thoroughly towards 
Namur, he tells him also that he must 
find out whether the Prussians intend 
to separate from the English, or to join 
them in trying the fate of another bat- 
tle. Then, when he has received Grou- 
chy's dispatches, showing his uncertain- 
ty as to where the Prussians had gone, 
but saying that if they went to Perwez 
he should follow them by that city, but 
that if they went to Wavre he should fol- 
low them in that direction, in order that 
they might not gain Brussels and to sep- 
arate them from Wellington, the emper- 
or in his second dispatch, tells Grouchy 

Also, Fragments Historiqiies relatifs a la Cam- 
pagne de 1815 et a la Bataille de Waterloo. Par 
le General Grouchy. Lettre a Messieurs M^ry et 
Barthelemy. Paris. 1829. Page 14, note. 



798 



Who Lost Waterloo ? 



[June, 



that he knows of one strong Prussian 
column having retreated on Wavre, and 
that he, Grouchy, must therefore take 
the "Wavre direction, so as to come near 
him, and connect himself with his oper- 
ations, following the enemy on his right 
with light troops only. Finally, having, 
doubtless, become somewhat uneasy at 
the fact that nothing was seen of the 
marshal by the cavalry -^ which he had 
sent out to the bridge of Mousty to look 
for him, and at the appearance of the 
Prussians on his right, he writes him his 
third and last dispatch, telling him that 
his Wavre movement is all right, but 
that he must operate so as to come near 
him and join him before any bodies of 
the enemy can attack him ; adding, how- 
ever, that he will not undertake to lay 
out his course for him. 

Now we are quite willing to allow 
that this method of directing the opera- 
tions of a detached wing of an ai-my is 
open to the charge of leaving too much 
to the good sense and military skill of 
the general commanding that wing. We 
are quite ready to admit that orders 
should have been sent to Grouchy dur- 
ing the night of the 17th and 18th, di- 
recting him to make for the bridge of 
Mousty at daybreak. But we cannot 
agree with Chesney ^ " that Napoleon 
did not in the least foresee the flank 
march of the Prussians." The emperor 
certainly did foresee the possibility of 
this when he dictated the Bertrand dis- 
patch, and he supposed that by warning 
Grouchy in a written order, when he 
sent him off, that the Prussians might 
undertake to unite with the English, he 
had taken ample precautions against the 
happening of this contingency. In a 
sense, the harsh expressions of Chesney 
and others about the utter state of igno- 
rance in which the emperor was as to 

1 Rapport du Colonel Marbot, 7me Hussards; 
Napoleon a, Waterloo, page 344. See also Siborne, 
2d ed., vol. i. p. 317. 

2 Chesney, page 207, 3d ed. See also Ken- 
nedy's Battle of Waterloo, page 161. But Gen- 
eral Sbaw-Kennedy considered this subject only 



the strategy of his enemies, that he did 
not take at all into consideration the 
possibility of the march of the whole 
Prussian army from Wavre to join Wel- 
lington, and so on, are true. They are 
true so far as this : that Napoleon, hav- 
ing intrusted the whole duty of finding 
out about the Prussians — where they 
were, and whether they were going to 
unite with the English or not — to Grou- 
chy, and having given him a competent 
force and plenty of cavalry and an ex- 
press warning as to the danger of th-e 
union of their army with the English, had 
considered that he had done all that was 
needful ; and undoubtedly he was taken 
by surprise when the blow came. But 
they are not true in the sense that Na- 
poleon was throughout blind to the pos- 
sibility of this junction of the allied ar- 
mies, and took no measures to prevent 
it. If an experienced sea captain, on 
approaching a dangerous coast, intrusts 
the deck to one of his officers, to whom 
he gives a sufficient number of men, and 
whom he warns to beware of the dan- 
gers arising from the force of certain 
ciirrents, and then goes below, he is un- 
doubtedly taken by surprise when the 
ship runs ashore. In his berth, asleep, 
he certainly did not foresee the catas- 
trophe. His principal, if not his only, 
fault was in his choice of the officer to 
whom he intrusted the deck. As to his 
knowledge of the perils of that part of 
the voyage, that cannot be questioned. 

So with Napoleon. His throwing the 
entire responsibility of taking care of 
the Prussians on Marshal Grouchy was 
his chief fault, for Grouchy was not able 
to sustain such a burden. Davoust, 
whom he might have had, and ought to 
have had, in Grouchy's place, would have 
successfully carried out his ideas. And 
while I fully admit the emperor's dila- 

incideutally ; his book is mainly concerned with 
the battle itself, of which it is the best nan-ative 
ever written ; and as he played a prominent part 
in the action it is specially valuable and interest- 
ing. 



1881.] 



Who Lost Waterloo ? 



799 



toriness on the morning of the 17th, by 
which the concentration of the Prus- 
sian army at Wavre was assured, which 
in fact made it impossible for Grouchy, 
or for Davoust even, to prevent this con- 
centration ; and while I also fully admit 
the negligence of the emperor in leaving 
Grouchy so long without any instruc- 
tions, except the warning of the possibly 
intended junction of the allied armies 
contained in the Bertrand letter, yet I 
cannot agree with those who, like Ches- 
ney, say that ^ " the notion that Grou- 
chy is responsible for the Waterloo de- 
feat must be dismissed, by those who 
choose to weigh the evidence, from the 
domain of authentic history to the limbo 
of national figments." The responsibil- 
ity must be divided between the emper- 
or and his lieutenant. Charging upon 
Napoleon, as we must, the faults above 
specified, it must yet not be forgotten 
that had Grouchy intelligently carried 
out the emperor's instructions contained 
in the Bertrand letter he might have 
been in a position to defeat, or at least 
to hinder, the junction of the allied ar- 
mies. His information early led him to 
the correct opinion that the Prussians 
were going to Wavre, for the purpose of 
uniting with the English. He wrote the 
emperor on the night of the 17th that 
if he found this was so he should try 
to prevent this scheme from being car- 
ried out. Yet he never even reconnoi- 
tred on his left, to ascertain what they 
were doing ; and he totally neglected 
the emperor's order to place detachments 
of cavalry between himself and the main 
army, so as to communicate directly and 
promptly with head-quarters. Instead 
of marching at break of day, he lost 
four hours by his inexcusable delay on 
the morning of the 18th. Instead of 
moving in the direction of Wavre by his 
left, and on the interior line by way of 

1 Chesney, page 207, 3d ed. 

2 And what can be said of the concealment for 
nearly thirty years of the order written by Gen- 
eral Bertrand i* What excuse can be made for the 
repeated and flat denials of the existence of any 



Mousty and on the left bank of the 
Dyle, so as to approach the main arrpy, 
and to be able to hinder any attack by 
the Prussians upon it, he marched upon 
AVavre by the right bank of the river, 
so as to leave the Prussians between him- 
self and the emperor. And even when 
the cannon of Waterloo convinced him 
that Wellington had halted to give bat- 
tle, he persisted in his mistaken course, 
refusing, probably in part from the influ- 
ence of petty personal feeling, the wise 
counsel of his subordinates to march to 
the field of battle.^ 

It is hardly to be questioned that, if 
Grouchy had moved at four o'clock in 
the morning by way of Mousty, and 
had put himself in communication with 
the main army, his forces would have 
stoj^ped the Prussian advance, and al- 
lowed the emperor the use of his whole 
army against the duke's forces, which 
were inferior in numbers and composi- 
tion. Instead of being obliged to de- 
tach 16,000 infantry against the Prus- 
sians, Napoleon could have used them 
against the English, and from what we 
know of the condition of Wellington's 
army in the latter part of the afternoon 
the result would have been a decided 
victory for Napoleon. If, on the other 
hand. Grouchy had, even as late as mid- 
day, changed his plan, and, following the 
advice of Gerard, had marched to join the 
emperor, he would certainly have avert- 
ed the catastrophe, even if he had ar- 
rived too late to insure a victory for his 
side. 

The literature of this campaign is vo- 
luminous. The fairest and fullest Eng- 
lish work is that of Captain Siborne. 
He wrote in 1844. His remarks on this 
much - disputed subject are free from 
that animus against Napoleon which de- 
forms the work of Chesney, in many 
respects so admirable. But Chesney, 

such written order ? None, save that that order con- 
tained an express warning of the possibility of the 
junction of the Prussians with the English, which 
Grouchy did nothing whatever to hhider. 



800 



The Portrait of a Lady. 



[June, 



Hooper, Kennedy, Charras, and Quinet 
all wrote during the second French em- 
pire, and with the intention of " explod- 
ing the Napoleonic legend,'" They were 
biased by the relation of their subject 
to the politics of the day. You find 
them now declaring, as Chesney sub- 
stantially does, that Grouchy did all that 
he ought to have done ; or else, like 
Charras, that if he had done all that he 
ought to have done he could not have 
affected the result. But in vain will 
you look for such a temperate and sound 
criticism as that which Siborne -^ passes 
on Grouchy's conduct. 

In most of the French narratives 
which defend Napoleon's course we also 
find unmistakable bias. In the brilliant 
but very untrustworthy history of the 
campaign by Thiers, in the quite elab- 
orate and valuable work of the Prince 
de la Tour d'Auvergne, there is much 
that must be wholly rejected : the former 



work is not to be depended on for its 
facts ; the latter draws many unwarrant- 
ed conclusions. A work which has es- 
caped public notice in great measure, 
entitled Souvenirs Militaires, Napoleon 
a Waterloo,^ by an old officer of the 
Imperial Guard, though rather prolix, 
is a very sound and valuable discussion 
of the whole campaign, and is well worth 
a careful study. 

I trust that I have not unnecessarily 
reviewed this famous controversy. It 
possesses a constant interest for all stu- 
dents of history. Apart from the dra- 
matic incidents of the catastrophe, the 
utter defeat in a pitched battle of a cap- 
tain so wonderfully able and experienced 
as Napoleon was must in itself always 
demand some explanation. I have sim- 
ply endeavored to bring some facts, hith- 
erto not generally known, to light, and 
to put the responsibility for the defeat 
where it belongs. 

John G. Ropes. 



p 

























-^ 



'■-) 



/ •K*\v VVS^ 






O C- , - ~ ■ 












> „. ^ * " ^ ^> 













X^ 



<.^ ^rL 



>. * 






^ ,0- 









•'■ 












^^^. ^ 




^s 



o. "* 



■<^^ •' 'p^ 

































^ r^ 




^ '■ 


A^ 


> 




G°^ 


■>• 


0^ 


i. 


o 


^ - 


.^ 





